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Abstract
The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates
as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability.
However, in practice real workers’ wealth is typically restricted. Therefore,
this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited liability.
The results show that if the cost function is sufficiently convex, first-best
effort will be more likely implemented under piece rates than under tourna-
ments. Moreover, if first-best implementation is not achieved and workers
earn positive rents, efforts and profits will be larger for piece rates than for
tournaments given sufficiently convex costs. While tournaments offer a par-
tial insurance due to their fixed prizes, piece rates may not work any longer if
potential losses become prohibitively high. Finally, if risk is sufficiently high,
piece rates will dominate tournaments despite the partial insurance effect
of tournament compensation. Since effort costs and risk may depend on an
individual worker’s characteristics, on the characteristics of his job and on
his hierarchical position, these findings have important implications for the
choice of incentive schemes and the allocation of workers in firms.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen (1981) there has been a wide
discussion of tournaments versus piece rates as alternative incentive schemes.
In a tournament, at least two workers compete against each other for given
winner and loser prizes. Under a piece-rate scheme, a worker’s payment
consists of a fixed payment and a certain percentage — the piece rate — of the
worker’s realized output in monetary terms.
There exist many examples for either incentive scheme in practice. Tour-
naments can be observed in sports (e.g., Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990,
Becker and Huselid 1992), in broiler production (Knoeber and Thurman
1994) and also in firms when people compete for job promotion (e.g., Baker,
Gibbs and Holmstrom 1994a, 1994b, Eriksson 1999, Bognanno 2001). Basi-
cally, corporate tournaments will always be created if relative performance
evaluation is linked to monetary consequences for the employees. Hence,
forced-ranking or forced-distribution systems, in which supervisors have to
rate their subordinates according to a given number of different grades, also
belong to the class of tournament incentive schemes (see, for example, Mur-
phy 1992 on forced ranking at Merck). Boyle (2001) reports that about 25 per
cent of the so-called Fortune 500 companies utilize forced-ranking systems to
tie pay to performance (e.g., Cisco Systems, Intel, General Electric). Another
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way of combining relative performance evaluation and tournament incentives
has been suggested recently by the German CEO Ulrich Schumacher of Infi-
neon. He has proposed to dismiss the 5 per cent least successful employees of
the workforce each year. Of course, there are also lots of examples for piece-
rate schemes in practice (see e.g. — among many others — Lazear 2000 on the
introduction of piece rates at the Safelite Glass Corporations, and Freeman
and Kleiner 1998 on the decline of piece-rate systems in the American shoe
industry).
Lazear and Rosen have shown that both incentive schemes lead to first-
best efforts given homogeneous and risk neutral workers with unlimited li-
ability. However, tournaments can dominate piece rates, since tournaments
only require an ordinal performance measure, whereas piece rates are exclu-
sively based on cardinal measures, and a cardinal scale usually leads to higher
measurement costs than an ordinal scale. Considering risk averse workers,
Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that there is no clear ranking between the
two incentive schemes, as the comparison crucially depends on the shape of
the workers’ utility functions and the magnitude of the risk. On the one
hand, if the magnitude is large, tournaments will provide a crude form of
insurance, since each agent receives at least the given loser prize and at most
the given winner prize. On the other hand, tournaments have the drawback
that in symmetric equilibrium the probability mass is distributed equally on
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the winner and the loser prize. In addition, Lazear and Rosen demonstrate
that tournaments will be problematic with heterogeneous contestants, if the
employer is not able to choose appropriate handicaps so that the contest
becomes even.
Green and Stokey (1983) emphasize that tournaments will dominate piece
rates if filtering of common noise is of major interest. In tournaments, com-
mon noise cancels out because of the relative comparison of the workers’
performance. Piece rates use an absolute performance measure and, there-
fore, cannot serve as a risk filter in a static context.
Malcomson (1984, 1986) points to an important advantage of tourna-
ments compared to piece rates. Since winner and loser prizes are fixed in
advance (i.e., the employer commits himself to certain labor costs before the
tournament starts), tournaments can create incentives even if the workers’
performance measure is non-contractible. However, an employer always needs
a contractible performance measure for utilizing piece rates as an incentive
scheme.
Demougin and Fluet (2003) compare tournaments and bonus schemes
under inequity aversion. The bonus scheme is defined as an individualistic
incentive scheme that gives a worker a certain base wage and, in addition, a
bonus if the worker has met a fixed standard. Since under the tournament
scheme wages are always unequal, tournaments turn out to be disadvan-
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tageous given a binding participation constraint. However, if workers earn
positive rents and the probability of meeting the standard is sufficiently large,
tournaments may dominate bonus schemes
Based on the theoretical results, several experimental papers have com-
pared the workers’ behavior in tournaments and piece rates (e.g., Bull, Schot-
ter and Weigelt 1987, von Dijk, Sonnemans and von Winden 2001). The
experimental results show that tournaments induce higher efforts than piece-
rates on average, but efforts vary more in tournaments.
Although workers’ liability is often limited in practice, the existing com-
parison of tournaments and piece rates has been restricted to the case of
unlimited liability. By this assumption, loser prizes in tournaments and fixed
payments in piece-rate schemes are allowed to be negative. Hence, not sur-
prisingly given risk neutral workers first-best efforts are implemented under
either incentive scheme. In tournaments, the optimal spread between winner
and loser prize can always be chosen to induce first-best incentives, whereas
the — possibly negative — loser prize is used by the employer to make the
workers’ participation constraint bind. In piece-rate schemes, optimal incen-
tives are created by choosing a piece rate of 100% and ”selling the firm” to
the worker.
However, under limited liability this central result of Lazear and Rosen
(1981) does not necessarily hold any longer. This paper compares both in-
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centive schemes under limited liability and highlights the main differences
between tournaments and piece rates.1 In particular, it can be shown that
the convexity of the workers’ cost function plays an important role: The
more convex the cost function the less likely first-best effort is implemented
under the tournament scheme compared to piece rates. Moreover, if workers
receive positive rents because of limited liability, efforts as well as profits will
be larger under piece rates than under tournaments given a sufficiently con-
vex cost function. Finally, if risk is sufficiently high, piece rates will dominate
tournaments.
Note that the workers’ cost functions and the given risk can be mainly
determined either by the workers’ individual characteristics or by the tasks
which have been delegated to them. In the first case, effort costs and risk
describe the workers’ types. In the latter case, they are implied by the
type of work organization chosen by the employer. On the one hand, the
employer may prefer specialization of the workers so that one individual
worker mostly performs either difficult (risky) or easy (non-risky) tasks. On
the other hand, the employer may want to avoid too monotonous work for his
employees so that he delegates different tasks to them. Note also that effort
costs typically increase with the hierarchical level of a worker. In addition,
1For a discussion of incentive problems under limited liability see Innes (1990), Park
(1995), Kim (1997) and Pitchford (1998). However, they choose a completely different
approach, as they look for the optimal contract under limited liability, whereas in this
paper two incentive schemes are compared that are frequently used in practice.
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the limited-liability problem is less severe the higher the employee’s position
in the corporate hierarchy (see also Kim 1997). For example, the wealth of
a manager is typically greater than that of a worker belonging to a lower
hierarchical level. Altogether, given the findings of this paper, the employer
carefully has to choose the optimal incentive scheme depending on the type
of workers, the type of work organization and the hierarchical level of the
workers.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
The results of the model are presented in Section 3 and discussed in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
To compare tournaments with piece rates, a model with one employer and
two workers is considered. All players are assumed to be risk neutral. When
choosing his effort ei worker i (i = A,B) can either have success (with prob-
ability p (ei)) or failure (with probability 1 − p (ei)). The function p (ei) is
assumed to be concave, i.e. p0 (ei) > 0 and p00 (ei) ≤ 0, with p (ei) ∈ [0, 1]. In
addition we assume p000 (ei) ≤ 0. The failure case is described by a (continuous
lottery or a) random output yL ∈ [−y¯L, y¯L) with y¯L > 0 and mean E [yL] = 0.
However, the case of success is characterized by a lottery which can only take
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strictly positive output levels yH ∈ [y¯L, y¯H ] with mean E [yH ] = YˆH > 0, i.e.
YˆH denotes the conditional mean given the case of success.2 In other words,
output is determined by a two-stage lottery. In the first stage, a worker can
either succeed or fail, in the second stage given success (failure) output is then
realized according to the random variable yH (yL). We assume that output
is contractible, whereas the employer does not observe ei. Worker i’s effort
costs are described by the convex function c (ei) with c (0) = 0, c0 (ei) > 0,
c00 (ei) > 0 and c000(·) ≥ 0. Each worker is assumed to have a reservation value
u¯ ≥ 0, and, in any given case, the employer wants to hire the two workers
(e.g., because of their human capital).3 The employer maximizes expected
total output minus labor costs (i.e., wages), whereas each worker maximizes
expected wages minus effort costs.
If the employer organizes a tournament between the two workers, at the
first stage of the game he will choose a winner prize w1 and a loser prize w2
prior to the tournament to induce incentives. Let ∆w = w1 −w2 denote the
prize spread. Then, for given tournament prizes, the two workers choose their
optimal efforts at the second stage. To model limited liability, the loser and
the winner prize are not allowed to become negative (w1, w2 ≥ 0). However,
2The two lotteries yL and yH are introduced instead of two deterministic values to have
a sufficiently rich structure for the following analysis. However, Section 4 will show that
the main results are robust with respect to the assumed production technology.
3Technically, we can assume that the employer’s reservation value is sufficiently nega-
tive. By this assumption, the first-best solution can only be reached within the employment
relationship.
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since positive incentives require w1 > w2, the limited-liability constraint
actually reduces to w2 ≥ 0. Under a piece-rate scheme, at the first stage of
the game the employer uses a linear incentive formula wi = α+βyi (i = A,B)
with yi as worker i’s realized output, α as a fixed payment and β as the piece
rate. Again, the limited-liability assumption for the workers requires wages
wi to be non-negative (wi ≥ 0). At the second stage, each worker chooses his
effort ei for a given pair (α, β).4
3 Results
As a benchmark result, the first-best effort eFB can be calculated. This effort
maximizes
E [yi]− c (ei) = p (ei) YˆH − c (ei) ,
which yields
YˆH =
c0
¡
eFB
¢
p0 (eFB)
=: h
¡
eFB
¢
. (1)
Note that due to the convexity of c (·) and the concavity of p (·), the function
h (·) is monotonically increasing. Hence, the higher the expected output in
case of success, the higher first-best effort eFB.
Under the tournament scheme, at the second stage of the game, worker i
4The wage parameters are decribed without a subscript because the two workers are
homogeneous.
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maximizes
EUi (ei) = w1p (ei) (1− p (ej)) +
w1 + w2
2
[p (ei) p (ej) + (1− p (ei)) (1− p (ej))]
+w2 (1− p (ei)) p (ej)− c (ei) .
With probability p (ei) (1− p (ej)) worker i becomes the winner of the tourna-
ment and receives the winner prize w1. He gets the loser prize w2 with proba-
bility (1− p (ei)) p (ej). If the two workers produce identical outputs, the win-
ner of the tournament will be randomly chosen by the employer using a fair
coin. This event happens with probability p (ei) p (ej)+(1− p (ei)) (1− p (ej)).
The first-order condition for optimal effort yields a unique and symmetric
equilibrium5 with each worker choosing effort e∗T (∆w), implicitly defined by
∆w
2
= h (e∗T ) . (2)
At the first stage, the employer choosesw1 andw2 to maximize 2p (e∗T (∆w)) YˆH−
w1−w2 subject to the workers’ incentive constraint (2) and their participation
constraint
w1 + w2
2
− c (e∗T (∆w)) ≥ u¯. (3)
It is straightforward to show that the employer can implement eFB and make
5Since the workers’ objective functions are strictly concave, the second-order condition
always holds.
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the participation constraint bind by choosing
wFB1 = c(e
FB) + u¯+ YˆH and wFB2 = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯− YˆH .
Note, however, that due to the limited-liability assumption w2 ≥ 0 this
solution will only be feasible if
c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ h
¡
eFB
¢
⇔ c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ YˆH . (4)
Under the piece-rate scheme, the workers want to maximize
EUi (ei) = α+ βE [yi]− c (ei) = α+ βp (ei) YˆH − c (ei) .
Their incentive constraint is given by
βYˆH = h (e
∗
PR) (5)
and their participation constraint by
α+ βp (e∗PR) YˆH − c (e∗PR) ≥ u¯. (6)
Therefore, the employer can implement eFB and make the participation con-
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straint bind by setting
βFB = 1 and αFB = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯− p
¡
eFB
¢
YˆH .
Note that in the worst case each worker’s wage becomes wi = α + β (−y¯L).
Hence, because of the limited-liability assumption, the first-best contract¡
αFB,βFB
¢
is only feasible for
c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ p
¡
eFB
¢
YˆH + y¯L. (7)
Comparing (4) with (7) leads to the following results:
Proposition 1 (i) The higher the workers’ reservation value, u¯, the more
likely eFB is implemented under either incentive scheme. (ii) If
y¯L
1− p (eFB) <
(>) YˆH, implementation of eFB will be more likely (less likely) under a piece-
rate than under a tournament scheme.
The intuition for result (i) comes from the fact that workers can be given
stronger incentives the higher their wealth. If workers have high reservation
values, the employer will have to compensate the workers for these foregone
values by a large lump-sum payment when they sign the contract. By this,
the workers’ wealth increases significantly so that it is more likely that the
employer wants to create sufficiently high incentives which lead to first-best
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effort.6 Hence in this context, large reservation values of the workers are
strictly welfare enhancing.
Result (ii) can also be explained intuitively: Under the piece-rate scheme,
the higher the possible loss | − y¯L| in case of a failure, the higher the fixed
payment α must be, which is necessary for compensating the worker in the
worst case so that wi ≥ 0. Hence, the higher | − y¯L|, the less likely αFB is
sufficiently large to compensate the worker. Of course, if y¯L = 0, there will
be no limited-liability problems when using piece rates. In the tournament
case, the optimal prize spread for implementing eFB is given by ∆wFB =
wFB1 − wFB2 = 2YˆH . The higher this prize spread, the higher the likelihood
that the loser prize that is needed for first-best implementation becomes
negative, which is not allowed under limited liability.
The inequality of Proposition 1(ii) also shows that the higher p
¡
eFB
¢
and, therefore, first-best effort eFB, the less likely this effort is implemented
under a piece-rate than under a tournament scheme. This result stems from
the fact that the employer ”sells the firm” to the workers by choosing βFB =
1. Hence, the workers receive the total expected output p
¡
eFB
¢
E [yH ] +¡
1− p
¡
eFB
¢¢
E [yL] = p
¡
eFB
¢
YˆH which decreases αFB. The higher expected
output, the higher the likelihood that the workers indeed have to pay a price
(i.e., αFB < 0), which is not allowed under limited liability. Note that
6See also Park (1995), pp. 488—489, Kim (1997), p. 910.
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according to (1), the magnitude of eFB directly corresponds to the shape of
the cost function c (·). The flatter the marginal cost function c0 (·) or the
less convex the cost function c (·), the higher will be eFB and, therefore, the
less likely first-best effort is implemented under a piece-rate than under a
tournament scheme.
Next, the employer’s complete optimization problem under limited liabil-
ity at the first stage of the game is considered. When organizing a tournament
the employer maximizes
πT = 2p (e
∗
T (w1 − w2)) YˆH − w1 − w2
subject to the participation constraint (3) and the limited-liability constraint
w2 ≥ 0, where e∗T (w1 − w2) is described by the incentive constraint (2)
with ∂e∗T/∂w1 = 1/ (2h
0 (e∗T )) and ∂e
∗
T/∂w2 = −1/ (2h0 (e∗T )). From the La-
grangian
LT (w1, w2) = 2p (e
∗
T (w1 − w2)) YˆH − w1 − w2
+λ1
·
w1 + w2
2
− c (e∗T (w1 − w2))− u¯
¸
+ λ2w2
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we obtain the following optimality conditions for w1 and w2:7
p0 (e∗T ) YˆH
h0 (e∗T )
− 1 + λ1
2
− λ1c
0 (e∗T )
2h0 (e∗T )
= 0 (8)
−p
0 (e∗T ) YˆH
h0 (e∗T )
− 1 + λ1
2
+
λ1c
0 (e∗T )
2h0 (e∗T )
+ λ2 = 0 (9)
λ1 ·
·
w1 + w2
2
− c (e∗T )− u¯
¸
= 0
λ2 · w2 = 0
λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0.
From (8) and (9) we get λ1+ λ2 = 2. Hence, at least one constraint must be
binding in equilibrium.
Under the piece-rate scheme with limited liability, the employer wants to
maximize
πPR = 2 (1− β) p (e∗PR (β)) YˆH − 2α
subject to the participation constraint (6) and the limited-liability constraint
α−βy¯L ≥ 0, with e∗PR (β) being implicitly defined by the incentive constraint
(5) with de∗PR/dβ = YˆH/h
0 (e∗PR). Hence, the corresponding Lagrangian is
7To simplify notation e∗T (w1 − w2) is written as e∗T .
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given by
LPR(α,β) = 2 (1− β) p (e∗PR (β)) YˆH − 2α
+λ1
h
α+ βp (e∗PR (β)) YˆH − c (e∗PR (β))− u¯
i
+ λ2 [α− βy¯L]
and the respective optimality conditions for β and α yield:8
(λ1 − 2) p (e∗PR) YˆH+(2 (1− β) + λ1β)
p0 (e∗PR) Yˆ
2
H
h0 (e∗PR)
−λ1c
0 (e∗PR) YˆH
h0 (e∗PR)
−λ2y¯L = 0
(10)
λ1 + λ2 = 2 (11)
λ1 ·
h
α+ βp (e∗PR) YˆH − c (e∗PR)− u¯
i
= 0
λ2 · [α− βy¯L] = 0
λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0.
Eq. (11) shows that — analogously to the tournament case — at least one
constraint must be binding in equilibrium.
Let e∗T (e
∗
PR) denote the equilibrium effort under the tournament (piece-
rate) scheme. We obtain the following results:
Proposition 2 Let c000 (ei) > 0. In equilibrium, three cases have to be dis-
8To simplify notation e∗PR (β) is replaced with e∗PR.
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tinguished: (i) If the participation constraint is binding but not the limited-
liability constraint, we get e∗T = e
∗
PR = e
FB. (ii) If both constraints are
binding, equilibrium efforts are described by
h (e∗T ) = u¯+ c (e
∗
T ) and h (e
∗
PR)
·
y¯L
YˆH
+ p (e∗PR)
¸
= u¯+ c (e∗PR) . (12)
(iii) If only the limited-liability constraint is binding, equilibrium efforts are
given by
p0 (e∗T ) YˆH
h0 (e∗T )
= 1 and
p0 (e∗PR) YˆH
h0 (e∗PR)
=
y¯L + p (e
∗
PR) YˆH
YˆH − h (e∗PR)
. (13)
Proof. See appendix.
Result (i) is not surprising. As we know from Lazear and Rosen (1981), if
there are no limited-liability problems (i.e., the limited-liability constraint is
not binding), first-best effort is implemented under either incentive scheme.
However, if the limited-liability constraint is binding, we will either have an
interior solution given that u¯ is not too large, so that the participation con-
straint does not become binding (result (iii)) or a corner solution otherwise
(result (ii)).
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In case (ii) with both constraints being binding, we have
∂e∗PR
∂
³
y¯L/YˆH
´ = − h (e∗PR)
h0 (e∗PR)
h
y¯L
YˆH
+ p (e∗PR)
i
+ h (e∗PR) p
0 (e∗PR)− c0 (e∗PR)
= − h (e
∗
PR)
h0 (e∗PR)
h
y¯L
YˆH
+ p (e∗PR)
i < 0,
since h (·) := c0 (·) /p0 (·). Hence, e∗PR decreases in y¯L and increases in YˆH ,
whereas e∗T is independent of both parameters. Therefore, given scenario
(ii), e∗PR will be more (less) likely to exceed e
∗
T if y¯L is small (large) and YˆH
is large (small). The intuition for the influence of YˆH immediately comes
from the incentive constraint (5): The higher the expected output in case
of success, the higher are the workers incentives induced by the piece rate.
The intuition for the impact of y¯L can be obtained from the limited-liability
constraint. The constraint is relaxed when decreasing y¯L, which leads to
higher incentives: The binding limited-liability constraint α = βy¯L can be
rewritten as β = α/y¯L, which — by using (5) — yields
h (e∗PR) =
αYˆH
y¯L
.
Case (iii) describes the typical scenario in which the two workers receive
a positive rent due to limited liability. For this case, (13) indicates, which
incentive scheme generates a larger effort. Again, e∗T is independent of y¯L, but
18
now increases in YˆH , because h0 (·) is an increasing function so that p0 (·) /h0 (·)
is decreasing. h0 (·) is monotonically increasing since h (ei) := c0 (ei) /p0 (ei)
and we have
h0 (ei) =
c00 (ei) p0 (ei)− c0 (ei) p00 (ei)
[p0 (ei)]
2 and
h00 (ei) =
[c000 (ei) p0 (ei)− c0 (ei) p000 (ei)] p0 (ei)− [c00 (ei) p0 (ei)− c0 (ei) p00 (ei)] 2p00 (ei)
[p0 (ei)]
3 > 0.
The intuition for ∂e∗T/∂YˆH > 0 can be seen from the employer’s objective
function. The employer wants to maximize expected profits. Hence, the
higher the expected outcome in case of success, the larger the effort level
he wants to implement. Rewriting condition (13) for e∗PR and using the
definition for h (·) gives
YˆHp
0 (e∗PR)− c0 (e∗PR)− h0 (e∗PR)
y¯L
YˆH
− h0 (e∗PR) p (e∗PR) = 0
so that
∂e∗PR
∂y¯L
= − −h
0 (e∗PR) /YˆH
YˆHp00 (e∗PR)− c00 (e∗PR)− h00 (e∗PR)
³
y¯L
YˆH
+ p (e∗PR)
´
− h0 (e∗PR) p0 (e∗PR)
< 0
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and
∂e∗PR
∂YˆH
= −
p0 (e∗PR) + h
0 (e∗PR)
y¯L
Yˆ 2H
YˆHp00 (e∗PR)− c00 (e∗PR)− h00 (e∗PR)
³
y¯L
YˆH
+ p (e∗PR)
´
− h0 (e∗PR) p0 (e∗PR)
> 0.
Therefore, the smaller (larger) y¯L and the larger (smaller) YˆH , the more (less)
likely will the optimal effort under the piece-rate scheme exceed the optimal
effort under the tournament scheme. The intuition for this result is the same
one as discussed under case (ii) above, but note that in this scenario the
participation constraint is not binding, i.e. both workers receive a positive
rent. Hence, additional incentives created by a decrease of y¯L or an increase
of YˆH are free for the employer — they only reduce the workers’ positive rents.
The parameter y¯L characterizes the maximum loss/gain in case of a failure
and, therefore, the risk of the failure lottery (see Section 2). If the employer
were able to control this risk to some extent, we would have a trade-off
between the costs of risk reduction and additional incentives under the piece
rate scheme although both workers are risk neutral.
Unfortunately, without specifying c (ei) and p (ei) no direct comparison of
the workers’ efforts and the employer’s expected profits is possible. Hence, let
c (ei) =
κ
3
e3i (with κ > 0), p (ei) = γei (with γ > 0) and u¯ = 0. Furthermore,
let
γ3YˆH < κ (14)
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so that p
¡
eFB
¢
< 1.9 For this example the following results can be obtained:
Proposition 3 (i) Workers receive a positive rent under either incentive
scheme. (ii) Under the tournament scheme, the employer implements e∗T =
γ2YˆH
2κ and receives expected profits π
∗
T =
γ3Yˆ 2H
2κ . (iii) Under the piece-rate
scheme, the employer implements e∗PR =
√
y¯2Lκ+3γ3Yˆ
3
H−y¯L
√
κ
3γYˆH
√
κ and gets π
∗
PR =
2
27
µq
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − y¯L
√
κ
¶
6γ3Yˆ 3Hκ+y¯
2
Lκ
2−y¯Lκ
3
2
√
y¯2Lκ+3γ3Yˆ
3
H
γ3Yˆ 3Hκ
3
2
> 0. (iv) y¯L →
YˆH leads to e∗T > e
∗
PR and π
∗
T > π
∗
PR, whereas y¯L → 0 implies e∗T < e∗PR
and π∗T < π
∗
PR. Moreover, there exists a cut-off value κ¯ =
3γ3Yˆ 2H
4(YˆH−y¯L)
so that
e∗T > (<) e
∗
PR if κ < (>) κ¯.
Proof. See appendix.
The parametric example considered in Proposition 3 belongs to case (iii)
of Proposition 2. The reservation value u¯ is sufficiently small so that an
interior solution is achieved in which only the limited-liability constraint is
binding and both workers earn positive rents. The impact of y¯L and YˆH on
workers’ efforts as claimed in the discussion of Proposition 2(iii) is supported
by Proposition 3, which can be seen from the parametric expressions for e∗T
and e∗PR. Moreover, for large (small) values of y¯L workers exert more (less)
effort in the tournament than under the piece-rate scheme. y¯L influences the
9We have YˆH = c0
¡
eFB
¢
/p0
¡
eFB
¢
which implies eFB =
q
γYˆH
κ . Hence, p
µq
γYˆH
κ
¶
< 1
yields γ3YˆH < κ.
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employer’s expected profits in the same way. If y¯L is large (small), expected
profits will be higher under the tournament (piece-rate) scheme. Finally, the
results of Proposition 3 indicate that the workers’ cost function influences
the effort choices under the two incentive schemes differently. Of course, the
more convex the cost function (i.e., the higher κ), the lower workers’ effort
under either incentive scheme, but effort declines more rapidly under the
tournament than under the piece-rate scheme.
Proposition 2 as well as the example of Proposition 3 assume that the
third derivative of the cost function is positive. Now we consider the special
case in which this assumption does not hold, i.e. we assume c000 (ei) = 0.
Note that this assumption corresponds to a quadratic cost function. Let this
cost function be described by c (ei) = c2e
2
i with c > 0. If in this situation
p00 (ei) < 0, the results of Proposition 2 will still go through, since h (ei) is
convex. However, if p00 (ei) = 0, the first equation of (13) given in Proposition
2 becomes problematic, because now p (ei) and h (ei) are linear. Let in this
scenario p (ei) = γei (with γ > 0) denote the linear probability function. To-
gether with quadratic costs c (ei) = c2e
2
i we obtain h (ei) =
cei
γ and, therefore,
first-best effort
eFB =
γYˆH
c
.
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Let again p
¡
eFB
¢
< 1 to have a reasonable result, i.e.
γ2YˆH < c (15)
is assumed. Furthermore, we assume that, given first-best effort, the uncon-
ditional mean of the composed output lottery exceeds the minimum output
in case of success:
p
¡
eFB
¢
E [yH ] +
¡
1− p
¡
eFB
¢¢
E [yL] > y¯L
⇔ p
¡
eFB
¢
YˆH > y¯L ⇔
γ2Yˆ 2H
c
> y¯L. (16)
Finally, define four cut-off values for the reservation utility:10
uˆT ≡ YˆH
Ã
1− γ
2YˆH
2c
!
uˆ1PR ≡
γ2Yˆ 2H
2c
+ y¯L
uˆ2PR ≡
γ4Yˆ 4H − c2y¯2L
2cγ2Yˆ 2H
uˆ3PR ≡
³
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
´ 3y¯Lc+ γ2Yˆ 2H
8γ2Yˆ 2Hc
.
Note that uˆ1PR > uˆ
2
PR > uˆ
3
PR. Now we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Let c000 (ei) = 0. (1) If p00 (ei) < 0, the results of Proposition
10(16) ensures that uˆ2PR > 0 and uˆ
3
PR > 0.
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2 still hold. (2) If p00 (ei) = 0, the following results can be derived: (i) Under
the tournament scheme, eFB will be implemented if u¯ ≥ uˆT ; otherwise e∗T = 0.
Dropping the assumption that in any given case the employer wants to hire
the two workers, yields w∗1 = w
∗
2 = e
∗
T = π
∗
T = 0. (ii) Under the piece-rate
scheme, if u¯ ≥ uˆ1PR, first-best effort eFB will be implemented; if uˆ1PR > u¯ >
uˆ3PR, then e
∗
PR =
√
y¯2Lc+2γ2Yˆ
2
H u¯−y¯L
√
c
γYˆH
√
c
, and if uˆ3PR ≥ u¯, then e∗PR =
γ2Yˆ 2H−y¯Lc
2γYˆHc
.
Dropping the assumption that in any given case the employer wants to hire
the two workers, leads to the following results:
e∗PR = 0 and π
∗
PR = 0 if u¯ > uˆ
2
PR
e∗PR =
q
y¯2Lc+ 2γ
2Yˆ 2H u¯− y¯L
√
c
γYˆH
√
c
and
π∗PR = 2
µq
y¯2Lc
2 + 2cγ2Yˆ 2H u¯− y¯Lc
¶
γ2Yˆ 2H −
q
y¯2Lc
2 + 2cγ2Yˆ 2H u¯
γ2Yˆ 2Hc
> 0
if uˆ2PR ≥ u¯ > uˆ3PR
e∗PR =
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
2γYˆHc
and π∗PR =
³
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
´2
2γ2Yˆ 2Hc
> 0 if uˆ3PR ≥ u¯.
Proof. See appendix.
The results of Proposition 4 show that, under quadratic costs and a linear
probability function, tournament incentives will completely break down, if
the employer is able to choose between hiring and no-hiring to guarantee
non-negative profits. This result can be explained by the fact that effort costs
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are too high for generating positive incentives under the tournament scheme.
According to the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix, the employer’s profit
function is given by
πT = 2γ
∆wγ
2c| {z }
e∗T (∆w)
YˆH −∆w − 2w2.
Hence, inducing higher incentives by marginally increasing the prize spread
∆w leads to marginal gains YˆHγ2
c
, but due to (15) marginal net gains YˆHγ
2
c
−1
are negative. Here the cost parameter c prevents the employer from gener-
ating any positive incentives. However, we have a completely different result
for the piece-rate scheme. Consider again the scenario in which the employer
does not unambiguously hire the two workers. Of course, if the workers’
reservation value is too large (u¯ > uˆ2PR), it will not pay for the employer
to hire the two workers, but otherwise strictly positive effort levels are im-
plemented: The incentive constraint e∗PR =
βγYˆH
c
shows that — analogously
to the tournament case — a large cost parameter c also decreases incentives
under piece rates, but for u¯ ≤ uˆ2PR efforts are always positive.
The various cases for the piece-rate result can be best explained by the
employer’s profit function
πPR (β) = 2β
(1− β) γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
c
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and the workers’ participation constraint
βy¯L +
β2γ2Yˆ 2H
2c
≥ u¯.
The function πPR (β) describes a parabola open to the bottom, whereas the
left-hand side of the participation constraint describes the ascending part
of a parabola open to the top which goes through the origin. The profit
function has a unique maximum and the employer wants to implement the
corresponding effort by choosing the optimal piece rate β∗. If the reservation
value is sufficiently small (u¯ ≤ uˆ3PR), this effort implementation will not
contradict the participation constraint. However, if this optimal piece rate
is too low to satisfy the participation constraint, the employer will choose a
higher β that leads to a binding participation constraint but lower profits.
As long as profits remain positive (i.e., as long as u¯ is not too large), the
employer will choose this corner solution (uˆ2PR ≥ u¯ > uˆ3PR). If u¯ is very
large (u¯ > uˆ2PR), all piece rates that satisfy the participation constraint yield
negative profits. Consequently, the employer prefers not to hire the two
workers.
To sum up, on the one hand the previous results show that a small y¯L
favors piece rates since the limited-liability constraint of the piece-rate scheme
is relaxed. On the other hand, a small YˆH makes tournaments relatively
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attractive compared to piece rates, because the optimal prize spread is small,
which relaxes the limited-liability constraint of the tournament scheme, and
because piece-rate incentives are directly decreased. Moreover, the findings
indicate that tournaments will become more problematic than piece rates if
the workers’ cost function is very steep. In the next section, the robustness
of these results will be discussed.
4 Discussion
The findings above may be criticized by the fact that we have not considered
the standard tournament model by Lazear and Rosen (1981). Hence, the
derived results may not hold in general. However, there is a good reason for
looking at a different model: Contrary to our model, in the Lazear-Rosen
framework pure-strategy equilibria will not always exist. Existence is only
guaranteed, if there is sufficient luck in the tournament and the cost func-
tion is sufficiently convex.11 Moreover, the endogenously derived tournament
prizes also enter the existence condition. Finally, doing comparative statics
may be problematic, since the existence condition can be violated.
In this section, we abstract from all these problems and assume existence
(as, among others, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)
11See Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), p. 27.
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do, for example) to check how the results above will change within the Lazear-
Rosen framework, which assumes a different production technology: Now
let worker i’s (i = A,B) output be described by the production function
qi = ei + εi. ei denotes i’s effort choice and εi exogenous noise which is
distributed over [−ε¯L, ε¯H ] with mean εˆ and ε¯L, ε¯H > 0. As in Lazear and
Rosen (1981), εA and εB are assumed to be identically and independently
distributed (i.i.d.). Let G(·) denote the cumulative distribution function and
g(·) the density of the composed random term εj − εi (i, j = A,B; i 6= j).
All the other assumptions of Section 2 are retained.
In this framework, the first-best effort eFB maximizes E [qi]−c (ei), which
yields
c0
¡
eFB
¢
= 1 (i = A,B).
Under the tournament scheme, at the second stage of the game, worker i
maximizes
EUi (ei) = w2 +∆w · pi (ei, ej)− c (ei)
for given w1 and w2 with pi (ei, ej) denoting i’s probability of winning (i, j =
A,B; i 6= j). Since i will win, if qi > qj, we have pi (ei, ej) = G (ei − ej) and
pj (ei, ej) = 1−G (ei − ej). Hence, ∂pi/∂ei = ∂pj/∂ej = g (ei − ej), and the
equilibrium will be unique and symmetric with each agent choosing effort
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e∗T (∆w) implicitly defined by
∆wg (0) = c0 (e∗T ) .
At the first stage, the employer chooses w1 and w2 to maximize 2e∗T (∆w)−
w1 − w2 subject to the workers’ incentive constraint ∆wg (0) = c0 (e∗T ) and
their participation constraint
w1 + w2
2
− c (e∗T (∆w)) ≥ u¯.
The employer can implement eFB and make the participation constraint bind
by choosing
wFB1 = c(e
FB) + u¯+
c0
¡
eFB
¢
2g (0)
and wFB2 = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯−
c0
¡
eFB
¢
2g (0)
.
Because of the limited-liability constraint w2 ≥ 0, this solution will only be
feasible if
c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥
c0
¡
eFB
¢
2g (0)
⇔ c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ 1
2g (0)
. (17)
Under the piece-rate scheme, the workers’ incentive constraint is given by
β = c0 (e∗PR), which implicitly defines optimal effort e
∗
PR (β), and their par-
ticipation constraint by α+β (e∗PR (β) + εˆ)− c (e∗PR (β)) ≥ u¯. Therefore, the
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employer can implement eFB and make the participation constraint bind by
choosing
βFB = 1 and αFB = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯− eFB − εˆ.
Due to limited liability, the workers’ wages still have to be non-negative
in the worst case, i.e. wi = α + β (e∗PR (β)− ε¯L) ≥ 0. Hence, first-best
implementation will be feasible if
c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ εˆ+ ε¯L. (18)
The employer’s complete optimization problems are described by the two
Lagrangians
LT (w1, w2) = 2e
∗
T (∆w)− w1 − w2 + λ1
·
w1 + w2
2
− c (e∗T (∆w))− u¯
¸
+ λ2w2 (19)
LPR(α, β) = 2 (1− β) (e∗PR (β) + εˆ)− 2α (20)
+λ1 [α+ β (e
∗
PR (β) + εˆ)− c (e∗PR (β))− u¯] + λ2 [α+ β (e∗PR (β)− ε¯L)] .
and we obtain the following results:
Proposition 5 (1) If 1
2g(0)
> (<) ε¯L+ εˆ, implementation of eFB will be more
(less) likely under a piece-rate than under a tournament scheme.
(2) Let c000 (·) > 0. In the employer’s optimization problems at least one
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constraint is binding: (i) If only the participation constraint is binding, we
will have e∗T = e
∗
PR = e
FB. (ii) If both constraints are binding, equilibrium
efforts will be described by
c0 (e∗T )
2g (0)
= u¯+ c (e∗T ) and c
0 (e∗PR) · ε¯L = u¯+ c (e∗PR) .
(iii) If only the limited-liability constraint is binding, equilibrium efforts will
be characterized by
2g (0) = c00 (e∗T ) and
1
ε¯L
= c00 (e∗PR) .
(3) Let c (ei) = ηeδi with δ > 2 and η > 0. Given u¯ = 0 and the limited-
liability constraint is binding, if 1
2g(0)
> (<) ε¯L+εˆ, the workers will more (less)
likely receive a positive rent under the tournament than under the piece-rate
scheme.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 5 strongly supports the qualitative results of Propositions
1 and 2. The larger ε¯L and the smaller 1/g (0), the more advantageous
tournaments will be relative to piece rates. In particular, if
1
2g (0)
< ε¯L, (21)
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then first-best effort eFB will be more likely implemented under the tourna-
ment scheme (result (1)), e∗T > e
∗
PR if workers receive a positive rent (result
(2)(iii)), and workers will less likely earn positive rents under the tournament
scheme given the scenario of result (3). The intuition for Proposition 5(1)
is the same as the one for Proposition 1(ii): Here, ε¯L (instead of y¯L) char-
acterizes the worst case under the piece-rate scheme, in which the workers’
compensation must be still non-negative, and under the tournament scheme
wFB2 = c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ − c
0(eFB)
2g(0)
= c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ − 1
2g(0)
, which will become neg-
ative if 1
2g(0)
is too large. Note that the marginal winning probability, g (·),
determines incentives in the tournament and, hence, optimal prizes. If g (·)
is flat (i.e., the outcome of the tournament is mainly determined by luck)
— and, therefore, g (0) is small12 — effort incentives will be rather low (see
e∗T (∆w)). In this situation, the employer has to choose a sufficiently high
prize spread ∆w to restore incentives. This means, however, that the loser
prize w2 has to be rather small, and that wFB2 may become negative. Alto-
gether, a small value of ε¯L relaxes the limited-liability constraint under the
piece-rate scheme, whereas a small 1
2g(0)
relaxes the one under the tournament
scheme, which drives the remaining results of Proposition 5.
On the one hand, the results of Proposition 5 show that within the Lazear-
12Following Lazear (1995, p. 29), we can interpret 1/g(0) as a measure of luck or risk
in the tournament. Alternatively, we could interpret g(0) as a measure for the monitoring
precision in the tournament.
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Rosen framework no clear statements are possible whether the convexity
of the cost function has a higher impact on piece-rate incentives than on
tournament incentives. For example, if workers receive a positive rent, the
more convex the cost function the lower equilibrium efforts will be under
either incentive scheme, but the impact of this cost effect solely depends
on 1
2g(0)
and ε¯L (result (2)(iii) ). Moreover, inequality (21) is completely
independent of the cost function.
On the other hand, the Lazear-Rosen framework allows to examine whether
risk harms tournament incentives more than piece-rate incentives. First, note
that risk will not influence piece-rate incentives given risk neutral workers,
if there is unlimited liability. However, under limited liability maximum bad
luck clearly influences inequality (21): If ε¯L and, therefore, risk is large, piece
rates will be disadvantageous. As mentioned above, 1
2g(0)
can also be used as
a measure of risk. If 1
2g(0)
is large, tournaments will become disadvantageous,
too. Hence, we have to examine which of these two effects is dominant. Of
course, for ε¯L → ∞ (e.g., if the error terms are normally distributed) piece
rates become prohibitively expensive for the employer, but tournaments still
work. They offer workers a partial insurance, since minimum and maximum
income are determined by the loser and the winner prize, respectively. When
looking at less extreme cases, the comparison may lead to a different result.
Assume, for example, that the i.i.d. error terms εi and εj follow a normal
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distribution N (0,σ2) that has been truncated on the left at −ε¯L = −ε¯ and
on the right at ε¯H = ε¯. This implies that the convolution g (·) for εj − εi is
also a truncated normal distribution with mean zero. However, now the vari-
ance of the underlying normal distribution is given by 2σ2, and the composed
random variable εj − εi is distributed over the interval [−2ε¯, 2ε¯]. Defining
z := εj − εi the convolution can be written as
g (z) =
1√
2σ2
φ
³
z√
2σ2
´
1− 2Φ
³
−2ε¯√
2σ2
´
with φ (·) denoting the density and Φ (·) the cumulative distribution function
of the standardized normal distribution. We obtain
1
2g (0)
=
√
2σ2
2
1− 2Φ
³
−2ε¯√
2σ2
´
φ (0)
= σ
√
π
Ã
1− 2
Z −2ε¯√
2σ2
−∞
1√
2π
exp
½
−x2
2
¾
dx
!
,
(22)
which yields the following result:
Proposition 6 Let εi and εj follow a normal distribution N (0,σ2) truncated
at −ε¯ and ε¯. If σ2 < (>) ε¯2
ln 2
, the left-hand side of (21) will increase less
(more) rapidly in ε¯ than the right-hand side. If σ2 → 0 (σ2 →∞), inequality
(21) will always (never) hold.
Proof. See appendix.
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Proposition 6 shows that for low variances of the initial normal distri-
bution, inequality (21) is more likely to hold,13 whereas for high values of
σ2 the opposite is true.14 If the variance tends to zero, the inequality will
always be satisfied, whereas for sufficiently high variances it will always be
violated. Hence, tournaments will only dominate piece rates, if risk — i.e.
the variance of εi and εj — is not too large. Following Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Lazear (1995), εi and εj can be interpreted in different ways. For
example, they can (a) measure the exogenous risk of the given production
technologies, (b) the individual measurement errors when workers are evalu-
ated, or (c) the ex ante unknown abilities of the workers in case of symmetric
uncertainty. This means that, given limited liability, tournaments will only
be attractive for the employer compared to piece rates, if workers use quite
safe production technologies, the supervisors’ monitoring precision is not too
low, or initial uncertainty about the workers’ talents is sufficiently reduced
by introducing appropriate recruiting techniques.15
13In other words, increasing risk by a mean preserving spread will be less (more) prob-
lematic for tournaments than for piece rates, if the risk of the initial normal distribution
is low.
14Note that the results qualitatively also hold for the variance of the truncated con-
volution, V ar [z] = σ2

1−
4ε¯√
2σ2
φ
µ
2ε¯√
2σ2
¶
1−2Φ
µ
−2ε¯√
2σ2
¶

, since V ar [z] is monotonically increasing in
σ2.
15However, note that tournaments may be even problematic under such conditions, be-
cause existence of pure-strategy equilibria requires a sufficiently high risk, i.e. a sufficiently
flat density g (·) and/or a sufficiently convex cost function c (·).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, tournaments and piece rates have been compared under the
assumption of limited liability. The comparison has shown that, on the one
hand, risk or luck (i.e., the variance of the error terms) has a large impact on
the profitability of both incentive schemes. If risk is sufficiently high, piece
rates will dominate tournaments, because first-best implementation will be
more likely under a piece-rate scheme, and because efforts will be larger under
piece rates when workers earn positive rents.
On the other hand, the convexity of the workers’ cost function also plays
a crucial role: The more convex the cost function the less likely first-best
effort is implemented under the tournament scheme relative to piece-rates.
If the workers receive positive rents, efforts as well as profits will be larger
under piece rates than under tournaments.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) Substituting λ1 = 2 and λ2 = 0 into the optimality conditions imme-
diately replicates the benchmark result of Lazear and Rosen (1981) for the
case of unlimited liability. (ii) Combining the binding limited-liability con-
straints, the binding participation constraints, and the incentive constraints
(2) and (5), leads to (12). (iii) Inserting λ1 = 0 into (8) yields e∗T . Using
λ1 = 0 in (10) and the incentive constraint (5) gives e∗PR.
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i)—(iii) First, note that the employer does not implement eFB under either
incentive scheme. Under the tournament scheme, first-best implementation
requires c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ YˆH ⇔ c
¡
eFB
¢
≥ YˆH ⇔ γ3YˆH ≥ 9κ, which is not true
because γ3YˆH < κ according to (14). For the implementation of eFB =
q
γYˆH
κ
under the piece-rate scheme, we must have c
¡
eFB
¢
+ u¯ ≥ p
¡
eFB
¢
YˆH + y¯L ⇔
κ
3
µq
γYˆH
κ
¶3
≥ γ
q
γYˆH
κ YˆH + y¯L ⇔ −
2
3
γ
κ
q
γYˆHκYˆH ≥ y¯L, a contradiction. As
we know from Proposition 2, in this case the limited-liability constraint is
binding for both incentive schemes, i.e. we have w∗2 = 0 and α
∗ = βy¯L.
Under the tournament scheme, the worker’s incentive constraint is given
by
e∗T =
r
w1γ
2κ
,
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and the participation constraint by
w1
2
− κ
3
³w1γ
2κ
´ 3
2 ≥ 0.
The employer chooses w1 to maximize
πT = 2p (e
∗
T (w1)) YˆH − w1 = 2γ
r
w1γ
2κ
YˆH − w1.
The first-order condition yields
w∗1 =
γ3Yˆ 2H
2κ
.
Inserting into the participation constraint gives
γ3Yˆ 2H
24
6κ− γ3YˆH
κ2
≥ 0,
which is always true because of (14). Hence, the workers receive a positive
rent in equilibrium. Using the result for w∗1 yields
e∗T =
γ2YˆH
2κ
and π∗T =
γ3Yˆ 2H
2κ
.
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Under the piece-rate scheme, the incentive constraint becomes
e∗PR =
s
βγYˆH
κ
,
and the participation constraint
α∗ + βp (e∗PR) YˆH − c (e∗PR) ≥ 0
⇔ βy¯L +
2
3
βγYˆH
κ
q
βγYˆHκ ≥ 0,
which is always satisfied, i.e. workers receive a positive rent under piece rates,
too. The employer maximizes
πPR = 2 (1− β) p (e∗PR (β)) YˆH − 2βy¯L
= 2γYˆH
Ã
γYˆH
κ
! 1
2
(1− β)β 12 − 2y¯Lβ.
From the first-order condition we obtain
β∗ =
Ãs
y¯2Lκ
9γ3Yˆ 3H
+
1
3
− y¯Lκ
1
2
3γ
3
2 Yˆ
3
2
H
!2
.
Inserting into the incentive constraint and the profit function leads to
e∗PR =
q
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − y¯L
√
κ
3γYˆH
√
κ
and
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π∗PR =
2
27
µq
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − y¯L
√
κ
¶ 6γ3Yˆ 3Hκ+ y¯2Lκ2 − y¯Lκ 32qy¯2Lκ+ 3γ3Yˆ 3H
γ3Yˆ 3Hκ
3
2
.
(iv) The comparison of e∗T and e
∗
PR yields
e∗T =
γ2YˆH
2κ
> (<)
q
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − y¯L
√
κ
3γYˆH
√
κ
= e∗PR
⇔ 3γ3Yˆ 2H > (<) 4κ
³
YˆH − y¯L
´
. (23)
Hence, for y¯L → YˆH we have 3γ3Yˆ 2H > 0, whereas for y¯L → 0 we get 3γ3YˆH <
4κ which always holds because of (14). Solving inequality (23) for κ leads to
the cut-off κ¯ = 3γ
3Yˆ 2H
4(YˆH−y¯L)
.
Comparing the two profits gives
π∗T =
γ3Yˆ 2H
2κ
> (<)
2
27
µq
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − y¯L
√
κ
¶
6γ3Yˆ 3Hκ+ y¯
2
Lκ
2 − y¯Lκ
3
2
q
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H
γ3Yˆ 3Hκ
3
2
= π∗PR
⇔ 27γ6Yˆ 5H + 4y¯Lκ
µ
2y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − 2y¯L
√
κ
q
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H
¶
> (<)
24κ
1
2γ3Yˆ 3H
µq
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H − y¯L
√
κ
¶
⇔ 27γ6Yˆ 5H + 8κ2y¯3L + 12y¯Lκγ3Yˆ 3H + 24κy¯Lγ3Yˆ 3H > (<)³
24κ
1
2γ3Yˆ 3H + 8κ
3
2 y¯2L
´q
y¯2Lκ+ 3γ
3Yˆ 3H
⇒ 27γ6Yˆ 5H
³
27γ6Yˆ 5H + 16κ
2y¯3L + 72y¯Lκγ
3Yˆ 3H − 16y¯2Lκ2YˆH − 64γ3Yˆ 4Hκ
´
> (<) 0
⇔ Yˆ 3Hγ3
³
27γ3Yˆ 2H + 72κy¯L − 64κYˆH
´
> (<) 16κ2y¯2L
³
YˆH − y¯L
´
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For y¯L → YˆH the inequality boils down to Yˆ 3Hγ3
³
27γ3Yˆ 2H + 72κYˆH − 64κYˆH
´
>
0 ⇔ 27γ3YˆH + 8κ > 0. However, if y¯L → 0, the inequality becomes
Yˆ 3Hγ
3
³
27γ3YˆH − 64κ
´
< 0 which is true because of (14).
Proof of Proposition 4:
(1) The proof directly follows from the preceding discussion.
(2)(i) First-best implementation under the tournament scheme requires
c
¡
eFB
¢
+u¯ ≥ YˆH ⇔ u¯ ≥ YˆH 2c−γ
2YˆH
2c
= YˆH
³
1− γ2YˆH
2c
´
=: uˆT . If this condition
is not met, the employer will implement a smaller effort level. The workers’
incentive constraint is given by
e∗T =
(w1 − w2) γ
2c
and the participation constraint by
w1 + w2
2
− c
2
µ
(w1 − w2) γ
2c
¶2
≥ u¯.
The employer chooses w1 and w2 to maximize
πT = 2p (e
∗
T (w1 − w2)) YˆH − w1 − w2
= 2γ
(w1 − w2) γ
2c
YˆH − w1 − w2
=
γ2YˆH − c
c
(w1 − w2)− 2w2
(15)
< 0.
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Hence, the employer wants to minimize incentives and optimally chooses
w∗1 = 0 to induce e
∗
T = 0. By this, the participation constraint becomes
w2
2
≥ u¯
and the employer chooses w∗2 = 2u¯ to make the constraint just bind. Profits
are negative and given by π∗T = −2u¯. The assumption that the employer
unambiguously wants to keep the two workers is, of course, crucial here.
Otherwise, he would prefer to offer a tournament contract with w∗1 = w
∗
2 = 0
so that the participation constraint is not met. This would lead to e∗T =
π∗T = 0. The employer would neither want to induce first-best effort nor any
other positive effort level as his losses increase in any unit of effort he wants
to implement.
(ii) Implementation of eFB under the piece-rate scheme requires c
¡
eFB
¢
+
u¯ ≥ p
¡
eFB
¢
YˆH + y¯L ⇔ u¯ ≥ γ
2Yˆ 2H
2c
+ y¯L =: uˆ
1
PR. However, if uˆ
1
PR > u¯, the
employer will induce lower effort incentives. The incentive constraint is given
by
e∗PR =
βγYˆH
c
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and the participation constraint by
α+ βp (e∗PR) YˆH − c (e∗PR) ≥ u¯⇔ α+
β2γ2Yˆ 2H
2c
≥ u¯.
From the optimality conditions (10) and (11) above we know that the limited-
liability constraint will be binding, if first-best effort is not implemented.
Inserting α∗ = βy¯L into the participation constraint yields
βy¯L +
β2γ2Yˆ 2H
2c
≥ u¯.
The employer wants to maximize
πPR = 2 (1− β) p (e∗PR (β)) YˆH − 2βy¯L
= 2β
(1− β) γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
c
.
The first-order condition yields
β∗ =
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
2γ2Yˆ 2H
.
Inserting into the incentive constraint and the employer’s objective function
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leads to
e∗PR =
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
2γYˆHc
and π∗PR =
³
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
´2
2γ2Yˆ 2Hc
.
This solution is only feasible, if the participation constraint holds:
uˆ3PR :=
³
γ2Yˆ 2H − y¯Lc
´ 3y¯Lc+ γ2Yˆ 2H
8γ2Yˆ 2Hc
≥ u¯ with uˆ1PR > uˆ3PR ≥ u¯.
However, if this condition is not met, the interior optimum cannot be achieved,
because the corresponding piece rate is too low to satisfy the workers’ par-
ticipation constraint. Hence, the employer has to increase β so that the
participation constraint holds, but now his profits decrease with any increase
in β. Therefore, given uˆ1PR > u¯ > uˆ
3
PR the employer chooses the lowest β
that makes the participation constraint
βy¯L +
β2γ2Yˆ 2H
2c
≥ u¯
just bind, i.e. we have a corner solution with
β∗ =
q
y¯2Lc
2 + 2γ2Yˆ 2Hcu¯− y¯Lc
γ2Yˆ 2H
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which implies
e∗PR =
q
y¯2Lc+ 2γ
2Yˆ 2H u¯− y¯L
√
c
γYˆH
√
c
and
π∗PR = 2
µq
y¯2Lc
2 + 2cγ2Yˆ 2H u¯− y¯Lc
¶
γ2Yˆ 2H −
q
y¯2Lc
2 + 2cγ2Yˆ 2H u¯
γ2Yˆ 2Hc
.
Dropping the assumption that in any case the employer wants to hire the
two workers also changes the results for the piece-rate scheme. Of course, the
interior-solution result still holds, since the employer earns positive expected
profits. However, the corner-solution result changes. Note that expected
profits πPR = 2β
(1−β)γ2Yˆ 2H−y¯Lc
c
are only positive for piece rates that meet
β < 1− cy¯L
γ2Yˆ 2H
.
Hence, if
β∗ =
q
y¯2Lc
2 + 2γ2Yˆ 2Hcu¯− y¯Lc
γ2Yˆ 2H
> 1− cy¯L
γ2Yˆ 2H
⇔
u¯ >
³
γ2Yˆ 2H
´2
− y¯2Lc2
2γ2Yˆ 2Hc
=: uˆ2PR with uˆ
2
PR > uˆ
3
PR,
profits will become negative and the employer prefers not to hire the workers.
He offers a piece-rate contract with α∗ = β∗ = 0 which leads to e∗PR = π
∗
PR =
45
0. Note that the employer never wants to implement first-best effort since
uˆ1PR > uˆ
2
PR.
Proof of Proposition 5:
(1) This result immediately follows from comparing (17) and (18).
(2) Using (19) and (20), the equilibrium efforts can be derived analogously
to Proposition 2.
(3) Given a binding limited-liability constraint and u¯ = 0, workers will
receive a positive rent under the tournament scheme, if w1
2
− c (e∗T ) > 0 with
e∗T being described by subcase (2)(iii) (i.e., 2g (0) = c
00 (e∗T )). Substituting
for w1 according to the incentive constraint w1g (0) = c0 (e∗T ) leads to
c0(e∗T )
2g(0)
−
c (e∗T ) > 0 ⇔ 12g(0) >
c(e∗T )
c0(e∗T )
. Using the specific form of the cost function
yields
e∗T = c
00−1 (2g (0)) =
µ
2g (0)
ηδ (δ − 1)
¶ 1
δ−2
and the inequality becomes
δ
2g (0)
>
µ
2g (0)
ηδ (δ − 1)
¶ 1
δ−2
. (24)
Under the piece-rate scheme, workers will get a positive rent, if α+β (e∗PR + εˆ) >
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c (e∗PR (β)) with e
∗
PR being characterized by subcase (2)(iii), i.e.
e∗PR =
µ
1
ηδ (δ − 1) ε¯L
¶ 1
δ−2
.
Because of the binding limited-liability constraint α+ β (e∗PR − ε¯L) = 0 and
the incentive constraint β = c0 (e∗PR) the inequality can be rewritten as ε¯L +
εˆ >
c(e∗T )
c0(e∗T )
. By using the parametric form of the cost function and the concrete
expression for the equilibrium effort e∗PR we obtain
(ε¯L + εˆ) δ >
µ
1
ηδ (δ − 1) ε¯L
¶ 1
δ−2
. (25)
Comparing (24) with (25) completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Differentiating (22) (and therefore the left-hand side of (21)) with respect
to ε¯ gives
∂ 1
2g(0)
∂
= 2 exp
½
− ε¯
2
σ2
¾
.
Hence, the left-hand side of (21) will increase less rapidly in ε¯ than the right-
hand side, if
2 exp
½
− ε¯
2
σ2
¾
< 1⇔ σ2 < ε¯
2
ln 2
.
The second result of Proposition 6 becomes obvious by inspection of (22).
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For σ2 → 0, the upper limit of the integral tends to −∞ and the whole
integral tends to zero so that (22) goes to infinity. If σ2 → ∞, the upper
limit of the interval tends to zero so that the whole interval goes to 1
2
and,
therefore, the term in brackets to zero. However, the expression σ
√
π in front
of the brackets grows more rapidly to infinity.
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